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Abstract— The fast development and expansion of any service organizations which followed by increases in the asset numbers 
that’s need to have a proper maintenance strategy which should be cost effective. The aim of any strategy is to have a plan 
that contribute to improve asset performance by reducing downtime of asset failures. 
The aim of this paper is to set plan that determine the processes of creating failure code that can create a library of failure
modes with its consequences and risk. This allow service provider to quickly understand the problem and any action that can 
be taken which have already proven by failure mode effect analysis. Also it’s identify most of the functional failures that 
might happened in the critical asset in the OETC’s network. In this study the transformer asset class was taken into the 
consideration for full failure mood and fault tree analysis. 
Defining failure codes can give specific instructions to complete a task to reduce the main time to wait in any failure from the
total main time to repair, and any smiler failure mode from other assets the corrective action will remain consistent.  
The selective processes of creating a failure code give the organization a more holistic view of transformers risk which will be
used to improve maintenance strategy by integrate those codes into work order system like CMMS. 
Index Terms— OLCM: On line condition monitoring, OETC: Oman Electricity Transmission Company, CMMS: 
computerized Maintenance Management System, RCM: Reliability Centered Maintenance, RCA: Root Cause Analysis,
FTA: Fault Tree Analysis
I. INTRODUCTION 
Asset Performance Management shall constantly endeavor to monitor and continuously improve the performance of 
the asset management system in order to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of the transmission system in line with 
the Asset Management Objective. This process aims to provide a philosophy concerning the way to identify the source 
of failures and to change in working practices, values, relationships and culture in the company by focusing on how to 
manage failures rather than to select desired proactive tasks. Usually implemented when the systems fail to do what 
user want form the asset to do, but also aimed to improving the effectiveness of equipment by eliminating problems 
once and for all, by sustaining a level of asset care and good practice that prevent deterioration. 
The process start up with a fault tree analysis (FTA). FTA is a logical diagram which shows the relation between 
system failure, and a specific undesirable events in the system as well as failures of the components of the system. The 
undesirable event constitutes the top event of the tree and the different component failures constitute the basic event of 
the tree where that must end with a desired outcome, and this needs to have a right process to manage the deliverables 
of proactive tasks. 
II. FAILURE CODIFICATION APPROACH  
With this emphasis on preserving what the RCA wants, Moubray [1] defines RCM as: “A process used to determine 
what must be done to ensure that any physical asset continues to do what its users want it to do in its present operating 
context.” RCM approach considers seven questions as a starting point of the process. 
1- What are the function and associated performance standards of asset in its present operating context?  
2- In what ways does it fail to fulfil its functions?  
The failure behavior of the selected assets should be identified by analyzing them under FTA approach that gives an 
overview of the subsystem failure contribution to the top event.  
3- What causes each functional failure?  
The common failure modes that may affect asset performance capability  
4- What happen when each failure occur? 
Understanding the effect of each failure modes will helps to evaluate the consequence of risk. This description 
identifying the level of severity and how could effect on the objectives of corporate business performance.     
5- In what way does each failure matter?  
The process focusing on managing the consequences of failure of each failure mode which is categorized as the 
followings: 
•Hidden failure consequences: which has no direct impact to the operating crew under normal circumstances, but it 
may has serious/ catastrophic consequences, and most of those failure may happened in electrical system where, the 
deterioration of normal current are many and the source of problem are deferent as well.    
• Safety and Environment Consequences: these are evident failures; the majority of this consequence can be defined 
on the risk assessment task, in order to know if this kind of risk can kill someone or breach any environmental 
regulations.  
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• Operational Consequences: these are evident failures; shutdown and blackout are the most critical time in the 
transmission line services, and the impact of blackout in long term can be reflected on the management quality of 
asset performance. These include lost production, increased operating costs, degradation in product quality, poor 
customer service, etc. 
• Non- Operational Consequences: this kind of consequences caused by evident failure mode which has neither 
adversely effect on operation capability nor safety & environment, where their impacts on cost of repair only.  
In so doing, those categories emphasize firstly on safety and environment issues, and then it focuses on how to manage 
failures rather than to select desired proactive tasks.  
Process to Evaluate the Consequences of Failure: 






6. What can be done to predict or prevent each failure? 
The Proactive Task Selection Process defined in Fig.1 below. 
 
Figure 1: Proactive Task Selection Process 
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7. What should be done if a suitable proactive task cannot be found?  
Default tasks known as the tasks that includes run- to failure, failure finding and redesign. In other hand, the process 
advice to go through reactive tasks and that may eliminate the effects of failures once it occur. 
III. TRANSFORMER FMEA 
Power transformers in the transmission system are one of the main assets that can effect on the network reliability if 
they fail to do its operation. According to a described FTA of Transformer that is illustrated on the below diagram Fig.
2, each subsystem functions of the main asset class like transformer’s oil should be identified clearly. Furthermore, 
transformer’s oil plays as an insulation factor and it may fail due to water ingress, oil poor quality and oil contamination 
and also, the other purpose of transformer’s oil is to maintain the dissipated heat into stabilized level, where its failure 
correlated with cooling system failures and due to deterioration of auxiliary’s performance such as breathing system. 
Figure 2:  Transformer Fault Tree 
According to above Fig. 2, each subsystem events should be analyzed throughout consequence evaluation in 
conjunction with the required proactive task that is shown in Fig. 1, and each number in Fig. 1 (1,2,3,4,5) refer to the 
maintenance category (CBM, PBM, …) that are linked with described consequence of that event. Furthermore, to create 
a failure code each subsystem will be considered as a separate function (F) and defined with a unique number, and its 
functional failures (FF) that are defined in FTA will take place as an alphabet later. Each functional failure has its own 
failure modes (FM) that again numbered with a unique number and all similar failure modes of different functional 
failures will be described with same number as they have same nature of failure but cause different failure. Table .1 
below illustrate failure mode effect analyses of power transformer. 
TABLE I. POWER TRANSFORMER (FMEA) 
Function  Function Failure  Failure Mode/Cause 
1 Bushing 
A Bushing Structure 
1 Gasket Fail 
2 Housing Fail 
3 Fitting Fail 
B Conductor/Lead 4 Connection/Brazing  
C Insulation Material 
5 Paper Deterioration  
6 Lead Fail 
7 Oil contamination 
8 Aluminum foil Fail 
9 Test Tap 
2 Tap changer  
A Drive Mechanism Fails 
10 Motor Fails 
11 Gear Box and shaft Fails 
12 Limit Switch Fails 
13 Manual Operation Fail 
14 Power Supply Fail 
B Tap Selection Switch 15 Contacts Wear 
C Diverter Switch Fails 16 Contacts Failure 
17 Resistor fail 





Tank Rupture / 
Leaks 
Oil Fail Auxiliaries Active Part 
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D Tap Changer Oil 7 Oil Contamination 18 Oil Level low 
E OLTC Compartment 
19 Bucholz Relay fail 
20 PRD Fail 
21 Fiber Glass Cylinder 
3 Tank 
A Bucholz Relay fail 
22 Float Fail 
23 Switch Disconnected 
24 Bucholz Valve Fail 
B PRD Fail 
25 Disk Fail 
26 Spring Fail 
23 Switch Disconnected 
C Covers & Main Body 
1 Gasket Fail 
27 Corrosion 
28 Lack of Maintenance 
80 Environmental Stress 
29 Physical Damage 
4 Oil 
A Prticles in the Oil 
30 Overheated 
31 Aging 
B Poor Oil Quality  32  Poor Oil Quality  
C Water Ingress 
33 Oil Leak 
31 Aging 
34 Breather Fail 
5 Auxiliary 
A Cooling System 
35 Fan Fails 
36 Pump Fails 
37 Radiator Fails 
B Breathing System 
38 Supply Fail 
39 Silica gel Fail 
40 Heater Fail 
41 Oil Cap Fail 
42 Conservator Tank Fail 
C Monitoring System 
43 Sensors Fail 
44 Analyzer Equipment Fail 
45 Carrier Gas Cylinder Fail 
6 ACTIVE PART 
A Winding 
6 Lead Fail 
46 Insulation Paper (Celleulose) 
B Core 
47 Displacement of Core steel 
29 Physical Damage 
48 DC Magnetization  
IV. MANAGEMENT RISK of TRANSFORMER FAILURE AND CREATING FAILURE CODE 
The risk assessment framework defined within OETC based on the ratio between likelihood and consequences (critical 
analysis). Contribution of the subsystems failure to the major failure should be taken into account. Hence, risk 
assessment would be estimated according to asset management risk framework that covers expected load no longer 
meeting security standard, expected load interrupted, expected asset loading, safety, environmental and financial 
impact. The total score of the classified risk consequences that is shown in appendix- A will be escalated or 
deescalated according to the probability of failure (likelihood) which was identified from the past incidents and then 
simulated with corporate risk register to understand the impact of those failure on the whole business. This correlation 
gives asset management engineers the rational basis to decide the required solutions, and the right maintenance actions 
to be performed. Also, managing system failures against risk, will help to categorizing the required subsystem spares 
according to risk level, and to set a contingency plan of backup spares limitation by defining maximum backup spares 
from the minimum one within the inventory list. Therefore, failure codes could be vary according to the current risk 
situations which will help also the service provider to understand the nature of failure and the required action complete 
the work order and to close the incidents once it happened. Fig. 3 shows risk scoring practice within OETC and the total 
score will be converted into corporate risk level. 
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Consequence 6 21 27 32 36 39 41 42
Consequence 5 15 20 26 31 35 38 40
Consequence 4 10 14 19 25 30 34 37
Consequence 3 6 9 13 18 24 29 33
Consequence 2 3 5 8 12 17 23 28
Consequence 1 1 2 4 7 11 16 22














































Figure 3:  OETC Risk Assessment Methodology. 
After defining transformer FMEA, each failure mode with the specific functional failure is linked with consequence 
code reference (H, S/E, O, N), and with suitable proactive task number then with the defined risk level for each failure. 
Therefore, the failure code of transformer (TX) bushing (Bu) failure is: TX, Bu, 1A1, S/E1, Low  that defined in the 
Table II below.









Risk Level  
System Subsystem  F FF FM 1 2 3 4 5
(Expected load no longer 
meeting security standard, 
expected load interrupted, 
expected asset loading, 
safety, environmental, 
financial impact) *Appendix- A
TX Bu 1 A 1 S/E    (2,5,5,14,2,5) = 33 Low  
From Table I, table. II and according to RCM approach, fifty five kind of failure code have been created for the 
transformer failure. All the created transformer failure code have been started with TX, where TX was selected as a 
reference symbol of the transformer asset class.  
Nonetheless, the study not conducted only to create a failure code, but also gives a hypothesis of failure behaviors in the 
network by analyzing each failure with its consequence and gives an overview of the risk level with desired 
maintenance plan, which create an approach of risk based maintenance strategy that focusing on selecting the right 
action upon the status of risk against cost under the point view of technically feasible and worth doing. It has been 
observed that the total transformer failure that could be monitored around 49 failures out of 55 failures and the 
remaining 6 failures, where 4 of them will be controlled under maintenance restoration task and the other 2 will be 
taken under default actions. Therefore the total detectable failure around 89.09% and the non-detectable failure around 
10.91%. From another angle, according to risk evaluation for each failure, it has been noted that the total low risk 
around 76.36 %, while moderate risk level covers 21.82 % from the total risk and only 1.82 % considered as a high risk 
level. No extreme risk has been considered according to the records of risk management register. Consequently, the 
total debatable failure with risk level will be as the following: 37 failures as a low risk, 11 failures moderate risk and 1 
failure as a high risk.  From this standpoint, asset management launch a project to establish and implement a continuous 
On-Line Condition Monitoring (OLCM) system for OETC’s network assets.  It was found that the probabilistic tangible 
benefits are derived from the failure code model, where the failure rate of transformers is 0.5% [2] for average age of 
OETC transformers according to CIGRE Guide 248. According to the reliability centered maintenance 
recommendations which describe the desirable of condition monitoring implementation against other maintenance 
Asset Management Risk Framework Enterprise- Wide Risk Management 
Framework
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tasks, 89.09% of 0.5 % of probable failure can be detected by condition monitoring activities.  Hence the probabilistic 
detectable failure rate by condition monitoring task is around 0.044. If the capital cost of power transformer of 750 
MVA is considered about 1.5 million Omani Rials, than the total probabilistic detectable tangible benefits around 
66,000 Omani Rials. Such studies could be implemented taken failure code model as a reference which could be vary 
from utility to the other, according to their experience and to the type of risk appetite.  
Figure 4:  Transformer Proactive Task 
V. FAILURE CODE SYSTEM MODEL AND CMMS INTEGRATION   
Asset Management, introduced a failure codification management system, the codes installed on OETC servers and it 
provides full support that centralizing the information within the CMMS system. This vision needs many stages and 
tools that can be shortly defined as a Failure Codification Model that has a closed framework process to enhance risk 
management system and to provide modern analytic strategy. To cope with strategic model, failure code shall control 
the systematic approach in terms of incident data management, required maintenance over risk, performance system 
study, maintenance strategy and asset performance management.  
The output and benefits of implementing failure codification model are addressed below: 
 Centralize failure code within CMMS system 
 Governance data management system 
 Avoid discrepancy between failure and right proactive action 
 Organizing the circulation of failure risk review process 
 Secure and document incident register with failure code and then align it with risk status  
 Adhere service provider engineer to follow the process of maintenance and failure codification review process 
 Referencing failure code and asset sock over age profile 
 Helps to analyze asset system failure. 
 Enhanced regulatory compliance and reporting 
In CMMS, failures codification is loaded in term of sets. Each set consist of failure code, cause code and resolution 
code. In other words, table I above is transformed into CMMS to create failure codifications. Moreover, table III below 
illustrates an example of failure codification. 
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TABLE III. FAILURE CODES EXAMPLE IN CMMS 
Failure Cause Resolution Failure set 
Code Description Code Description Code Description Code Description 





Each failure code starts with “F” and three digit numbers indicating a unique failure code, similarly, cause codes starts 
with “C” and resolution codes starts with “R”. 
Failure codes of table I are programmed in CMMS in a systematic way, such that whenever an engineer chooses certain 
failure, system limits all causes to that failure. Correspondingly, it limits all resolutions based on the chosen cause of 
the failure. 
Failure analysis section in CMMS supports engineers in following up historical failure data, modifying or adding new 
failure codes and it shows the hierarchy of all failure codes which displays the linkage of all failure, cause and 
resolution. Fig. 5 below shows failure analysis section in CMMS, where engineer can search for any previous failure 
stored in CMMS. 
 
Figure 5: Failure Analysis section in CMMS 
Failure sets gather all failures, causes and resolution in one code based on asset class, which make it easier for an 
engineer to record or search for a failure in certain asset group. 
Another feature of failure codes in CMMS that it is linked with work orders. Any failure occurs while executing a work 
in the site can be recorded to that particular work order. Moreover, this linkage between failure codes and work orders 
will keep a historical record of all failures in each asset, which will supports the management in taking decisions. 
VI. CONCLUSION  
There is a need for raising the quality level of maintainability with improved RCM procedure and guidelines from 
failure code. With respect to the identified issues, the paper is recommends the followings: 
 Review and improve the present maintenance against risk 
 Create a unique failure code and that has to be utilized within company documentations   
 Increase general awareness of the risk level and prepare proper mitigation / contingency plan 
The proactive tasks from RCM have been designed to fit risk impacts under consideration of cost effective 
maintenance. Also, any maintenance program has to be scheduled to meet risk mitigation plan and to ensure the 
availability of spare parts when it’s required. The importance of availability of spare parts is to maintain and to 
optimize spare parts inventory to support reliability and maintainability objectives. Strategic spare parts 
requirement has to be aligned with failure code to ensure best availability level and to meet security standard 
requirements. 
OETC implement this concept on the other critical assets like: transformer, switchgear, protection system, 
overhead lines and underground cables. All critical assets have now a unique failure code that give the service 
provider a full picture of the failures and their mitigation actions. Also, this model document the failures with the 
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proposed codes that are linked with risk management process which will be reviewed quarterly basis once there 
extreme and high risk. 
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APPENDIX A       
MWh NS
0
72,000 MWh and Above
33,600 MWh to 71,999 MWh
16,800 to 33,599 MWh
2,400 to 16,799 MWh
800 to 2,399 MWh












































Expected Load no Longer meeting Security 
Standard
The expected amount of load (in MW) no longer meeting the required security 
standard for the duration of the asset restoration or implementation of the 
Expected Load Interrupted MWh NS
0
2,400 MWh and Above
1,800 to 2,399 MWh
1,200 to 1,799 MWh
600 to 1,199 MWh
200 to 599 MWh













































The expected amount of load (in MW) interrupted for the duration of the asset restoration or 
implementation of the mitigating action (in hours)
Expected Asset Loading % NS
0
> 120%
> 115% <= 120%
> 110% <= 115%
> 105% <= 110%
> 100% <= 110%

















































·   Multiple fatalities where a Company 
or an Officer from the Company may 
be held liable.
·   Single fatality and/or multiple 
injuries at resulting in irreversible 
impairment/inability to work
·   Injury or impairment** to one or 
more persons resulting in person 
admitted to hospital or reportable to 
regulatory body or restricted duties or 
lost time
·   Injury requiring medical attention 
and follow up treatment
·   Injury requiring medical attention 














































Expected safety impact resulting from asset event
Environmental Impact lts or kg NS
56,000 Litres of Oil or 200 kg SF6 or Above
18,000 to 55,000  Litres of Oil or 150 to 199.9 kg 
SF6
9,000 to 17,999 Litres of Oil or 100 to 149.9 kg 
SF6
4,500 to 8,999 Litres of Oil or 50 to 99.9 kg SF6
2,000 to 4,499 Litres of Oil or 5 to 49.9 kg SF6



























































Expected environmental impact resulting from asset event Finance OMR NS
 250,000 OMR or Above
 100,000 to 249,999 OMR 
 50,000 to 99,999 OMR 
 25,000 to 49,999 OMR 
 10,000 to 24,999 OMR 






















































Expected direct financial impact resulting from asset event (excluding lost revenue)
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